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EXPLOITATION AND COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
ALAN WERTHEIMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial surrogacy has been criticized on many grounds. It has been
argued that surrogacy is baby-selling, that it is harmful to the children born to
surrogates, that it is harmful to many other children whose sense of security is
undermined by the practice, and that it is harmful to women as a class.' An-
other line of argument maintains that surrogacy involves the wrongful
"commodification" of procreational labor, or that it violates the Kantian max-
im that persons should never be treated merely as means but always as ends in
themselves.2
In addition to and often intermixed with these (and other) arguments, it is
frequently said that surrogacy exploits the surrogate mothers. "[O]nce money
enters into the arrangement [the] possibilities of exploitation are everywhere."3
"One of the most serious charges against surrogate motherhood contracts is
that they exploit women.' '. "The prohibition on payments may be understood
as protecting... women-especially poor, single women-from being ex-
ploited.., paid 'breeding stock."' 5 Despite the frequency with which these
claims are made, they are typically advanced without much analysis or argu-
ment. In this paper I examine commercial surrogacy in light of some of the
* John G. McCullough Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont B.A.,
New York University, 1964; Ph.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1968. This paper is an ab-
breviated and slightly rewritten version of Chapter Four. Commercial Surrogacy, of my book
ExPLOrrATION (1996) (Copyright © 1996 by Princeton University Press).
1. For an argument which focuses on the effects of surrogacy on women as a class, see
Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1992). Apart
from other effects on women as a class, the legitimation of surrogacy might impose psychic costs
on many women, especially poor women, who would then have to treat the decision not to be a
surrogate as a constant foregone opportunity to earn additional income for their family. See Henry
Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 57 (1989).
2. Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990).
For a critique of this view, see Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 132 (1992).
3. PETER SINGER & DEANE WE. s, THE REPRODUCiE REVOLUION 125 (1984).
4. MARTHA FEWD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25 (1988).
5. Alexander M. Capron & Margaret J. Radin, Choosing Family Law Over Contract as a
Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLrrMCS AND PRIVACY 59,
62 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). "But the core reality of surrogate motherhood is that it is both classist
and sexist: a method to obtain children genetically related to white males by exploiting poor wom-
en." George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POL1-
TICS AND PRIVACY 43, 43 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). "Mhe danger of exploitation of one human
being by another appears... to outweigh the potential benefits in almost every case." MARY
WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE 46 (1985).
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distinctions advanced in my introductory paper. I ask whether surrogacy is a
case of harmful exploitation or mutually advantageous exploitation and wheth-
er there are good reasons to think that surrogacy arrangements are typically
nonconsensual. The discussion of commercial surrogacy will also allow us to
sharpen the distinction between the truth conditions of an exploitation claim
and the moral force of exploitation. For even if surrogacy is exploitative, we
must ask whether such exploitation provides good reasons for prohibiting or
refusing to enforce surrogacy contracts.
I. IS SURROGACY EXPLOITATIVE?
Putting aside the possibility that surrogacy is not exploitative at all, there
appear to be two possible answers. On one view, surrogacy is a case of harm-
ful exploitation. The intended parents gain from the transaction while the
surrogate makes a "grave self-sacrifice."' On a second view, surrogacy is a
case of mutually advantageous exploitation. Both the intended parents and the
surrogate gain from the transaction but the distribution of those gains is unfair
to the surrogate There is, however, a third view, one which is difficult to
locate in terms of the distinction between harmful exploitation and mutually
advantageous exploitation. On this view, surrogacy is exploitative because the
intended parents gain from a transaction that is fundamentally immoral. For
want of a better term, call this moralistic exploitation! Because I believe that
moralistic objections to surrogacy must involve some sort of harm to the sur-
rogate if they are to ground a claim of exploitation, I shall consider harmful
exploitation under the rubrics of nonmoral harm and moral harm before going
on to consider mutually advantageous exploitation.
Ill. SURROGACY As HARMFUL EXPLOITATION
Nonmoral harm
It has been argued that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate in straight-
forward nonmoral terms.' But here we must be careful. In deciding whether
surrogacy is harmful, we must adopt an all-things-considered and ex ante
conception of harm. There are, after all, negative elements in virtually all
6. Anderson, supra note 2, at 87.
7. For example, it has been argued that surrogacy is exploitative because "the interests of
wealthy contracting couples are better served than those of the surrogates." Baby M and the Surro-
gate Motherhood Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 1013, 1024 (1987).
8. 1 do not mean "moralistic" in its derisive sense, in which it connotes a narrow moral
attitude, but to refer to arguments that go to the intrinsic immorality of a practice rather than the
gains and losses to the parties.
9. "Since there is evidence that surrogacy arrangements ... harm contracted mothers ... a
ban on commercial surrogacy needs to rely only on the harm principle [as opposed to legal moral-
ism]." Rosemarie Tong, The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Sur-
rogacy Arrangements, 21 J. Soc. PHIL. 40, 47 (1990). As it stands, this is a non sequitur. After
all, if surrogacy is harmful but consensual, a ban on commercial surrogacy cannot rely only on
some version of the Millian harm (to others) principle; it would need to rely on a principle of
paternalism. But the present question is not whether the surrogate is harmed with her consent, but
whether she is harmed at all.
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uncontroversially beneficial transactions. Paying money for a good that is
clearly worth the price is still a negative element in the transaction. It would
be better to get it for free. So the question is not whether surrogacy has harm-
ful elements, but whether it is harmful, all things considered, or a net harm.
We know that some surrogates, such as Mary Beth Whitehead, have regarded
their experience as a surrogate as harmful, all things considered. '° But this is
largely irrelevant to a general assessment of surrogacy even if we assume that
retrospective judgments are accurate indicators in an individual case. For the
question is not whether surrogacy is a net harm in a given case, but whether it
is typically or ex ante a net harm.
Surrogacy presents a particularly difficult context for making an all-
things-considered judgment because some of the crucial benefits and harms are
difficult if not impossible to measure and vary substantially from person to
person. On the positive side of the ledger, we have to put the value of the
monetary compensation and whatever psychological gratification the surrogate
obtains from the process. These benefits may or may not be considerable.
There is much that might appear on the debit side of the ledger: the risk of
physical harm or death resulting from the pregnancy or delivery, the inconve-
niences and discomfort associated with a normal pregnancy, and perhaps most
important, the psychic cost of the surrender of the baby to the intended par-
ents."1
At this point, the defender of surrogacy might reply that the ex ante value
of the surrogacy arrangement simply could not be negative, for, if that were
so, women would not agree to serve as a surrogates. But that is false. That a
woman agrees to serve as a surrogate does not show that the ex ante value of
surrogacy is positive; it only shows that she thought it would be positive. She
may have miscalculated, perhaps because surrogates are unable to make accu-
rate predictions of their future psychological reactions. Thus, it is possible that
surrogacy is harmful to most surrogates even though most surrogates believe it
will be beneficial.
In addition, it might be argued that most surrogates are objectively
harmed by their experience, even if they do not feel harmed. It is a common-
place that B's interests-as B defines them-can be harmed even if B is un-
aware that the harm has occurred. For example, B's self-acknowledged interest
in her reputation or the fidelity of her spouse can be damaged by libel or
infidelity, even if she is unaware that either has occurred. More controversial-
ly, it may be argued that a person's objective interests can be harmed even if
she does not now and never will regard these interests as her interests.
Given all this, is surrogacy ex ante harmful, all things considered? In view
of our limited factual knowledge and unresolved theoretical controversies over
10. See ELIZABETH KANE, BIRTH MOTHER (1988); MARY BETH WHrrEHEAD, A MOTHER'S
STORY-THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE (1989).
11. A surrogacy contract may stipulate that the surrogate agrees to refrain from alcohol,
tobacco, illicit drugs, and other risky activities. Although these restrictions are not independent
harms to the surrogate--they may be beneficial-they do represent restrictions on her freedom and
in that sense can be understood as costs.
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what counts as objective harm, I am inclined to think that we should now
remain agnostic.
Suppose that most surrogates are worse off for the experience, all things
considered. Could surrogacy be made advantageous, all things considered, if
the monetary compensation were higher? If we are operating in the territory of
the surrogate's nonmoral interests, I think it is entirely possible, nay inevitable,
that a sufficiently large increase in compensation would convert a net harm
into a net benefit for many women. Moreover, if surrogacy is typically mutu-
ally advantageous but unjust, this unfairness can be remedied in the same way.
Yet, and unlike other contexts in which it is uncontroversial that exploitation
can be negated by increasing the value received by the exploited party, it is
rarely argued that surrogacy would be less exploitative if the surrogate were
paid more. In fact, unpaid surrogacy is often thought to be less exploitative
than paid surrogacy. Among the critiques of surrogacy, higher pay is the dog
that doesn't bark.
Moral harm
Why does the higher pay dog not bark? I suspect that a wage increase is
rarely advanced as a solution to the alleged exploitativeness of commercial
surrogacy because it is thought that procreative labor should not be exchanged
for money, because the commodification of procreative labor is immoral."
And if procreative labor should not be exchanged for any money, it will not
improve things to exchange procreational labor for more money. But if, as I
have argued, the wrong of exploitation always involves a defect in the values
exchanged, the task is to see whether this perspective can be related to exploi-
tation. There are two ways in which the connection might be drawn: one fo-
cuses on the incommensurability of the values exchanged; the other focuses on
commodification.
For present purposes, I shall focus on the second idea. The
commodification argument maintains that whereas some goods and services
(for example, automobiles, houses, books, and at least some forms of labor)
are appropriately exchanged for money, other goods and services (for example,
citizenship, human beings, criminal justice, marriage rights) should not be
exchanged for money. 3 On this view, surrogacy is exploitative not because it
comes too cheap, but because it commodifies a form of labor that should not
be exchanged for money at all. 4
12. It is also possible that higher pay is not advanced as a solution because the very receipt
of monetary compensation may actually cause some of the psychological harm experienced by
surrogate mothers, for example, because they feel that they are doing something "sleazy." If so,
increasing the compensation may only make things worse on this score.
13. They should be treated as "blocked exchanges." See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JusTIcE 100 (1983).
14. Elizabeth Anderson states:
Commercial surrogacy attempts to transform what is specifically women's labor-the
work of bringing forth children into the world-into a commodity. It does so by replac-
ing the parental norms which usually govern the practice of gestating children with the
economic norms which govern ordinary production processes. The application of com-
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Now I suspect that some of the rhetorical force of the commodification
argument derives from linguistic aesthetics. Who could support something as
ugly as the com-mod-i-fi-ca-tion of procreational labor? But even if we as-
sume, arguendo, that it is wrong to commodify procreational labor, it does not
follow that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate. That is a different claim. So
on the assumption that the commodification of procreational labor is wrong,
we must ask whether the commodification of the surrogate's labor is: (1)
harmful to the surrogate's objective nonmoral interests, (2) harmful to the
surrogate because she is participating in an immoral activity, or (3) wrong but
not harmful to the surrogate.
It might be thought that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate because
being treated as a commodity injures one's self-respect. It might also be
claimed that a person can lose the respect of others or be degraded in their
eyes even if she does not lose self-respect or become degraded in her own
eyes. But that raises at least two points. First, it is not clear that surrogacy
actually does have these effects. Second, to the extent that these effects stem
solely from the way surrogacy is regarded by the society-as a matter of fact
and without separate normative justification-it is not clear that it represents a
basis for condemning the practice rather than a basis for condemning society's
reaction.
Still, it might be argued that surrogacy harms the surrogate's objective
interests because it violates her rights, independent of any other physical,
economic, psychological, or social harm. If a woman has a right not to have
her labor commodified, then surrogacy is harmful precisely because it is a
violation of her rights. The problem here, of course, is that many acts that
would violate B's rights if done without B's consent do not violate B's rights
if done with B's consent. To put the point in Kantian terms, we do not treat a
person merely as a means rather than an end-in-herself if she consents to be
treated in that way. So the commodification of procreational labor is no obvi-
ous violation of the Kantian maxim if the commodification of the surrogate's
labor is consensual-absent some additional argument, for example, that the
rights involved are inalienable or that the consent is defective in some impor-
tant respect.'5
Suppose that we grant that the commodification of procreational labor
constitutes an objective harm to the surrogate. Still, it would not follow that
surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate, all things considered. Surrogacy would
produce a net harm to the surrogate only if the degree of harm that results
from the commodification of her procreational labor is greater than the ben-
efits that she received from the commodification of her labor and that has not
mercial norms to women's labor reduces the surrogate mothers from persons worthy of
respect and consideration to objects of mere use.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 80.
15. It might be argued that surrogacy commodities-and violates the Kantian maxim with
respect to--the child who, after all, does not consent to the arrangement. Although I do not see
how surrogacy could be harmful to the child who, after all, would not otherwise exist but for the
surrogacy arrangement, the present discussion is confined to the claim that surrogacy is harmful to
the surrogate mother.
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been shown. Moreover, increasing the compensation would arguably offset
such harm.
It may be argued, at this point, that surrogacy is injurious to the surrogate
not because she is treated badly, but because she participates in something
wrong. On this view, surrogacy is bad for the surrogate because it is bad for
her character. But here we must be particularly careful. It does not follow thatJust IMcas it.. is 1°  *_a ... +; ; " hn
jutbcas .tisbdt parti ate in something wrong that it is bad for the
person's interest to participate in something wrong. Still, to the extent that one
does have an interest in one's moral character, then participating in an im-
moral activity may be harmful to that person. 6 But, and once again, even if
we accept this line of argument, it is not clear that the harmful moral elements
necessarily outweigh the beneficial nonmoral elements, at least if we also
assume that surrogacy is otherwise advantageous to the surrogate. 7 Unless it
is assumed that the moral aspect of well-being always trumps the nonmoral
aspects of well-being, it is possible that the nonmoral aspect in which the
immoral choice is beneficial to the chooser's well-being is more weighty than
the moral aspect in which it is not.'
In the final analysis, I am inclined to think that it is very difficult to argue
that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate because surrogacy is wrong qua
commodification. Commodification may be better understood as a basis for
thinking that surrogacy is wrong for reasons unrelated to the interests of the
surrogate and, therefore, unrelated to worries about exploitation of the surro-
gate.
Suppose that I am wrong. Suppose that the commodification argument
does support the claim that surrogacy is exploitative. The moral force of that
argument would still have to be resolved. For if surrogacy is wrong and ex-
ploitative because it commodifies that which should not be commodified, it
does not follow that surrogacy should be prohibited or that surrogacy contracts
should not be enforceable.
IV. SURROGACY AS MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS EXPLOITATION
Suppose that the typical surrogate is not harmed by surrogacy or would
not be harmed if the compensation were higher. All things considered, surro-
gacy is or would be a mutually advantageous transaction. Still, surrogacy
might be a case of mutually advantageous exploitation if the transaction were
16. Now even if this sort of moral harm is possible, it is not clear to whom it applies. On
the one hand, we might say, with Plato, that all persons have an interest in being moral whether or
not they themselves believe they have such an interest. Or we might say, with Feinberg, that only
those who desire to be good persons have an interest in being good persons and can therefore be
morally harmed. See JOEL FEiNBERG, HARM TO OTHERs 65-70 (1984).
17. It is also not clear whether an increase in compensation to the surrogate would yield an
increase in the amount of moral harm or whether the degree of moral harm is inelastic with re-
spect to price.
18. We could think that moral considerations trump nonmoral considerations with respect to
what B should do without thinking that moral considerations tump nonmoral considerations with
respect to what is good for B. See THOMAs NAGEL, THE VIEw FROM NOwHERE 189-207 (1986)
(discussing the connection between "living right" and "living well").
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unfair to the surrogate. The problem, of course, is that if we are going to say
that a transaction is exploitative because it is insufficiently beneficial to the
exploited party, we may reasonably be asked to specify the criteria by which
we are making this assessment. This is a difficult matter.
It is, for example, frequently said that a fair transaction is one in which
both parties gain (roughly) equally. On that account, we can say that a surro-
gate is exploited if she receives less value from the transaction than the in-
tended parents. Unfortunately, this definition of a fair transaction is clearly
wrong. If a physician performs a procedure (for a normal price) that saves a
patient's life, we do not say that the physician has been exploited because the
patient has gained far more from the transaction than the physician. 9 In any
case, and notwithstanding that I do not have an alternative account to propose
at this point, I see no reason to think that a mutually advantageous transaction
cannot be unfair. So I prefer to suppose that the surrogate may be exploited
even if surrogacy provides a net benefit to her. On the other hand, if the com-
pensation is (or could be made) adequate, then we will have to conclude that
the surrogate is not (or would not be) exploited, whatever else we may want to
say about surrogacy.
Choice
I suspect that there is another reason why the higher pay dog doesn't
bark, and that relates to its effect on the quality of the surrogate's consent. If
the lure of compensation compromises the surrogate's consent by coercing her
to enter into the transaction or by distorting her judgment about the effects of
surrogacy on her well-being, increasing the compensation will only make
things worse.
Now resolving the question as to whether the surrogate gives appropriate-
ly voluntary consent may not be crucial to resolving the question as to wheth-
er she is exploited if, as I have argued, consensual exploitation is possible. But
it would still be of importance to determine whether there is a defect in con-
sent. It will be easier to justify the prohibition or nonenforcement of surrogacy
agreements if they are nonconsensual.
Coercion
On one familiar view, poor women are coerced (or forced) to become
surrogates because surrogacy represents an improvement over an unacceptable
status quo.2" The equally familiar response maintains that surrogacy offers
19. We also cannot say that a person is not exploited just because they receive more value
from the transaction than the other party. For if a physician charges an exorbitant price for the
procedure, we might say that the physician exploits the patient even though the patient receives
more value from the transaction than the physician.
20. "[A monetary offer) may be difficult for a person of little financial means to refuse and
would, in that case, be coercive." Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Mother-
hood?, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: PoLITcs AND PRIVACY, supra note 5, at 136, 146. "To
portray surrogacy contracts as representing meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of
the contracting surrogate mother, rather than to see her as driven by circumstances.., falls to
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women an additional option to their present menu of choices, and the addition
of options to one's menu of choices is always freedom enhancing rather than
coercive.
Which view is correct? On any standard account of coercion, surrogacy is
simply not coercive. In general, A coerces B to do X only if A proposes
(threatens) to make B worse off with reference to some baseline condition
unless B does X, and whatever else we might want to say about the intended
parents' proposal (offers can be unseemly without being coercive), they do not
propose to make the potential surrogate worse off if she turns it down."'
True, she might decide that becoming a surrogate is more attractive than her
other options. But that is true for all decisions in which one accepts an offer.
It may be thought that the preceding view fails to acknowledge that some
offers are simply "too good to refuse," and that nonrefusable offers are coer-
cive even if they add to one's present menu of options.' An offer may be
nonrefusable for two reasons, only one of which is problematic. If A offers B
an opportunity (a new job) that would render her so much better off than her
eminently acceptable status quo that it would be frrational for B to refuse,
there is no reason to refer to such offers as coercive or to think that they
compromise the voluntariness of B's choice. In other cases, however, the
short-term benefits contained in A's offer may be so tempting or irresistible
that they cause B to overlook the long-term harms. A does not threaten any
adverse consequence if B declines the offer, but A's offer serves to distort B's
judgment. I am inclined to think that this kind of offer is not best described as
coercive, but it may well compromise the voluntariness of B's choice by intro-
ducing cognitive errors into B's decision. Let us bracket worries about cog-
nitive errors. Still, it might be said that if B's status quo is highly unsatisfacto-
ry, as in The Drowning Case,23 then A's offer may be coercive even if B
makes a perfectly rational choice in accepting A's offer. But the model of
coercion exhibited in The Drowning Case is of no help to the argument that
surrogates are coerced. For, unlike A in The Drowning Case, the intended
parents have no special obligation to help potential surrogates without demand-
ing anything in return.
It seems, then, that the intended parents' proposal is an offer, and offers
do not coerce. And that, I think, is the truth. But it is not the whole truth. Let
us assume what is often alleged but has not been shown by the critics of sur-
take account of realities." FIELD, supra note 4, at 27. "To say that a woman 'chooses' to do
this ... is simply to say that when a woman is forced to choose between poverty and exploitation,
she sometimes chooses exploitation as the lesser of two evils." Tong, supra note 9, at 45. For
present purposes, I ignore the distinctions between being coerced, or forced, or acting under du-
ress.
21. Specifying the appropriate baseline against which to measure the proposal can be a com-
plicated question. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERcION 202-41 (1987).
22. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 233 (arguing that a proposal can be both coercive and "free-
dom-enhancing"); see WERTIIMER, supra note 21, at 232-33.
23. A comes upon B, who is drowning. A proposes to rescue B if B agrees to pay A
$10,000. A and B know that there are no other potential rescuers. ALAN WERTHEImER, EXPLorrA-
TION 110 (1996) (taking this example from Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE,
AND METHOD (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969)).
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rogacy, namely, that women choose to serve as surrogates only because they
are in dire economic straits. It may be argued that when background condi-
tions provide an inadequate range of opportunities, the moral quality or signifi-
cance of one's choice is diminished, even if the background conditions do not
compromise the "voluntariness" of the choice, strictly speaking.24 But even if
this is so, it is arguable that it is the background conditions that are the prob-
lem and not the offer that allows B to improve on those background condi-
tions. The offer is still a positive good. If a woman can reasonably regard sur-
rogacy as improving her overall welfare given that society has unjustly limited
her options, it is-arguable that it would be adding insult to injury to deny her
that opportunity. Whatever label we use to describe her choice, we must still
decide whether she should be allowed to make such a choice. And referring to
such choices as "coerced" will not resolve that substantive moral question.
Cognitive Errors
Considerations of coercion aside, I suggested that a woman's decision to
serve as a surrogate may not be appropriately consensual if the lure of the
financial gain motivates her to make a decision that she will regret or would
regret if she thought objectively about its effect on her life. Given that we do
not know whether surrogacy is typically harmful or advantageous, I do not
think that we can say whether the typical surrogate makes this kind of cogni-
tive error. Also, do not say that a woman's judgment cannot be appropriately
consensual just because she cannot fully anticipate what it will be like to give
up the child. People can voluntarily consent to sterilizations, sex change opera-
tions, abortions, and plastic surgery, and (shall we add?) marriage-where one
cannot or frequently does not have any experience with the consequences of
the decision. By comparison with some such decisions that we do allow, the
problem of miscalculation in surrogacy may be relatively small and more
amenable to preventive measures: restricting surrogacy to women who have
given birth and therefore have personal knowledge of the bonding process
(which would not have excluded Mary Beth Whitehead) and careful psycho-
logical screening (which might have excluded her).'
The claim that the surrogate makes a cognitive error would be more con-
troversial if her error derives from her failure to take proper account of objec-
tive or moral harms to her interests. But even if we correctly believe that the
surrogate's choice is nonconsensual for just this reason, it is less clear what
would follow. Here we return to the moral force of exploitation.
24. See Thomas Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES (1987).
25. It appears that an infertility center had performed a psychological evaluation of Mrs.
Whitehead and that she had "demonstrated certain traits that might make surrender of the child
difficult." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247 (NJ. 1988). Unfortunately, it also appears that
neither she nor the Stems were given this information.
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V. THE MORAL FORCE OF EXPLOITATION
What follows from all this with respect to societal intervention with com-
mercial surrogacy? If surrogacy is a case of harmful exploitation, we need to
ask whether paternalistic restrictions would be justified, although here our task
will be relatively easy, particularly if we have reason to think that there are
defects in the quality of the surrogate's consent. If surrogacy is a case of
harmful cum moralistic exploitation, we need to ask whether restrictions can
be justified on grounds of moral paternalism. That question would be at least
somewhat harder. It is a commonplace that a liberal democracy is not justified
in prohibiting transactions just because the transactions are morally suspect or
fail to incorporate the best conception of human flourishing. This is not be-
cause we lack confidence that the transactions are truly wrong, but because
there are reasons-good moral reasons-to prefer a political regime that does
not regard such wrongness as a sufficient justification for invoking the coer-
cive powers of the state.
If surrogacy is a case of mutually advantageous and consensual exploita-
tion, then it certainly does not follow that just because it is wrong for A to
exploit B, -that we should prohibit A from exploiting B. If exploitation is to
serve as an independent basis for social restraints, we would need to explain
how the exploitativeness of a transaction justifies interfering with a transaction
from which she benefits, particularly if prohibition is the only viable option.
Reducing Exploitation
But prohibition may not be the only viable option. Suppose that surrogacy
would be less exploitative (or nonexploitative) if the compensation were higher
or the contract terms were somewhat different. Might this justify societal
intervention?
It might, but unlike some other contexts of alleged exploitation, I see no
reason to believe that the compensation received by surrogates reflects a struc-
tural inequality of bargaining power.26 It seems to me that the potential surro-
gate should be in a very strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the intended
parents. I suspect that surrogates receive rather low compensation precisely
because surrogacy is viewed with such moral skepticism. Information and
competition are low. And unlike many other bargaining contexts, in which
bargainers believe they can legitimately press for a better deal, social norms
may suggest that it is inappropriate for a surrogate to hold out for a higher
wage. Somewhat ironically, the widespread acceptance of the moral norms to
which the critics of surrogacy often appeal may contribute to this-low com-
pensation-dimension of its exploitativeness.
In any case and for whatever reason, it is possible that left to their own
devices, most potential surrogates might be able to negotiate an agreement that
is less desirable than would be negotiated under a form of minimum wage.
26. But see Allen Wood, Exploitation, 12 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y. 136, 144 (1995) (maintaining
that prospective adoptive couples are typically in a "significantly stronger bargaining position").
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Some agreements would not occur. Some intended parents would be unwilling
or unable to pay the higher price. But many would." We would then face a
problem of moral trade-offs. We would need to weigh the moral importance of
reducing the exploitation of those who would be helped by this form of mini-
mum wage legislation against the cost to those who would be excluded from
the market because people refuse to purchase their services for the higher
minimum wage.
Yet the latter point highlights a moral consideration that many critics of
surrogacy have ignored. Any restrictions that discourage surrogacy arrange-
ments hurt those who would have benefitted from such arrangements and
arguably also interfere with their autonomy. If we are to respect the autonomy
of potential surrogates in the world in which they find themselves, it is impor-
tant that we not automatically apply to them the moral principles that define
our conception of an ideal world.2'
Autonomy
The question arises then as to whether considerations of autonomy would
preclude using exploitation as grounds for restricting mutually advantageous
and consensual surrogacy arrangements. An adequate answer to this question
would require a more fully developed theory of autonomy than I can of-
fer-for lack of a theory as well as space. But I do want to argue that two
strategies--one conceptual, one legal-that have been advanced as solutions to
this problem are less than fully satisfactory.
The conceptual strategy maintains that since a woman's "true" freedom or
autonomy is violated by surrogacy contracts, the prohibition of such contracts
does not constitute a violation of her freedom or autonomy.' I do not want
to deny that there is something to the notion of positive freedom or, perhaps
more accurately, to the values it attempts to capture. But even if we say that
"true" freedom includes proper self-development, and if we think that surroga-
cy "would detract from the ideal of human flourishing that society should seek
to foster," it remains an open question whether the right to choose not to be
positively or truly free is itself a crucial dimension of one's autonomy."
It might be objected at this point, that appeals to autonomy ignore the fact
that surrogacy "takes advantage of motivations-such as self-effacing
'altruism'-which women have formed under social conditions inconsistent
with genuine autonomy.' 31 And, the argument goes, we do not interfere with
a woman's genuine autonomy if we prohibit decisions that result from non-
27. Indeed, it is possible that there would be more surrogacy agreements at the higher price,
because it would increase the supply of potential surrogates.
28. For the distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, see JOHN RAwLS, A TH-
ORY OF JusTicE 8 (1971).
29. Prohibiting surrogacy contracts does not violate the autonomy of women because "the
content of the surrogate contract itself compromises the autonomy of surrogate mothers." Ander-
son, supra note 2, at 91.
30. Capron & Radin,'supra note 5, at 64.
31. Anderson, supra note 2, at 91.
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autonomously acquired motivations. But even if the surrogate's motivations
are not autonomous in this sense, it is not clear what would follow. We cer-
tainly do not think that we can justifiably prevent religious organizations from
soliciting or accepting donations just because we (even rightly) believe that the
motivations that give rise to those donations may have been formed under
social conditions inconsistent with genuine autonomy.32 Respect for a
person's autonomy sometimes requires that we respect choices that reflect
values that she presently accepts, even if we are rightly worried about the way
she acquired those values.
So much for the conceptual strategy. A popular legal strategy for resolv-
ing the tension between respecting autonomy and prohibiting surrogacy agree-
ments is to permit surrogacy transactions, but to "make the arrangement per-
formable or not at the option of the mother."" It might be thought that this
strategy would give us the best of both worlds: it would preserve the freedom
of women to enter into surrogacy arrangements, but would also preserve their
freedom to keep the child if they so wish. 4
Now it is entirely possible that the "unenforceaple contract" solution will
turn out to be the preferred public policy.35 Even so, it would not entirely
resolve the autonomy problem. There are two related ways in which it fails to
do so. First, it fails to acknowledge that the ability to enter into a binding
agreement is itself a crucial dimension of one's autonomy and that the "unen-
forceable contract" solution will deter some potential intended parents from
making agreements that potential surrogates would want to be able to make.
Second, it may be argued that in trying to protect women from having to
surrender a child against her strong maternal desires, we do not express the
appropriate respect for women as autonomous and responsible persons.'
Whether or not this line of argument is ultimately decisive, it suggests that the
unenforceable contract solution does not fully resolve the tension between
32. I have in mind contributions to "normal" religious organizations, not contributions which
are clearly the product of fraud. Interestingly, to the extent that surrogacy takes advantage of
altruistic preferences, it does not represent a problem of commodification. After all, it is one thing
to maintain that surrogacy does not represent a "gift" relation, and another thing to assume that it
does, but that women have been involuntarily socialized into giving such gifts.
33. FIELD, supra note 4, at 78.
34. Martha Field states:
One attractive feature of this solution is that it helps avoid resolution of the debate,
which is currently dividing feminists, about whether surrogacy exploits women or liber-
ates them. It recognizes the truth of both positions. Surrogacy is still available when the
surrogate mother desires ultimately to carry out the ontract .... But it avoids one of the
most troubling features-a contract severing the maternal bond when the mother is un-
willing to relinquish her child.
Id.
35. See Michael Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family
Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO LJ. 533 (1991).
36. Carmel Shalev states:
Her state of mind at the moment of agreement is not to be taken seriously because it is
subject to change during the performance of her undertaking, due to the nature of preg-
nancy. The insinuation is that it is unreasonable to expect her to keep her promise be-
cause her faculty of reason is suspended by the emotional facets of her biological con-
stituency.
CARMEL SLLEv, BIRTH PowER 121 (1989).
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protecting surrogates from decisions that they may come to regret and respect-
ing the autonomy of women.
Justice
Finally, I wish to consider a set of arguments for interfering with surroga-
cy contracts that appeals to considerations of justice. I say the set of argu-
ments "appeals to" considerations of justice, because these arguments variably
assert that surrogacy instantiates injustice, that surrogacy derives from injus-
tice, that surrogacy symbolizes injustice, that surrogacy reinforces injustice.
Note that some of these verbs suggest that surrogacy has a causal impact on
the social world, whereas others do not, and it may be crucial to establish just
which verb is most apt." Surrogacy could, of course, derive from injustice or
symbolize injustice without causing the world to be more unjust. By contrast,
the claim that surrogacy reinforces or creates injustice is to claim that the
world would be less unjust if surrogacy were prohibited.
There are at least three different lines of justice-based arguments that we
might consider. First, it might be argued that we should prevent transactions
that instantiate unjust distributions even if the transactions are beneficial to all
concerned. On this view, it is wrong to allow unjust transactions to occur,
even when (as contrasted with the world in which they do not occur) these
particular transactions are not bad for anyone. Now I do not think it unrea-
sonable for an individual to refuse to participate in a transaction that will
improve her welfare on the grounds that the transaction is unjust. But the
question is not whether an individual can herself reasonably refuse to partici-
pate in a beneficial transaction because it is unjust, but whether society can
justifiably prevent her from participating in such a transaction on the grounds
that it is unjust. And it is not clear that it can.
A second justice-based argument focuses on the relational dimension of
surrogacy. On this view, the problem is not that surrogacy results in different
"holdings," but that surrogacy instantiates highly asymmetrical and unjust
personal relations. Now relational inequality is a serious matter, and it must be
included in any all-things-considered assessment of whether a woman would
be benefitted or harmed by entering into a surrogacy transaction. But if a
woman can still plausibly maintain that she would benefit by such an arrange-
ment, it is hard to see why such transactions should be prohibited on the
grounds that the relation is unjust-at least if the welfare of the potential
surrogate is the focus of our concern.
That gives rise to a third line of argument, one that focusses on the nega-
tive externalities of commercial surrogacy. Just as it is often argued that por-
nography has harmful effects on virtually all women, it may be argued that
surrogacy has harmful effects on women as a class, because it reinforces in-
37. "[Dlistributive justice requires that society's benefits and burdens be distributed fairly
among different social classes .... Since women who are less well off will almost always be the
ones to serve as surrogates for wealthier or professional women, the distribution is not fair."
Macklin, supra note 20, at 147; see Annas, supra note 5, at 43.
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equalities of gender, although it might not be harmful, all things considered, to
the surrogates themselves, who are compensated for their services. 8
I want to make three points about this line of argument. First, if we argue
that a (potential) surrogacy arrangement between A and B should be prohibit-
ed because a policy of allowing such arrangements would have harmful effects
on third parties, then we are not claiming that it is the exploitation of B that
Justifies its prohibition. Second, even if the prohibition of surrogacy has egali-
tarian consequences, we would be imposing a burden on one class of women
(those who would be benefitted by serving as surrogates) in order to benefit a
larger class of women. We are, of course, often justified in imposing costs on
some persons in order to realize gains to other (present or future) persons. But
it is harder to justify imposing such costs when they are incurred by those
who are thought to be among the least well-off.
That brings me to the third point, namely, that we have no empirical
evidence to support the claim that the prohibition of surrogacy actually has
egalitarian consequences. Or, what amounts to the same thing, that the permis-
sibility of surrogacy would reinforce or perpetuate social inequalities. For all
we know, the legitimation of commercial surrogacy might serve to empower
women in their relations to men.39 Indeed, it is arguable that prohibiting sur-
rogacy might simply shield our eyes from the background inequalities from
which it derives, while allowing surrogacy would forcefully bring those in-
equalities to our attention and motivate us to change them.
V. CONCLUSION
Let us be clear as to what the previous arguments do and do not show. If
commercial surrogacy is a case of harmful and nonconsensual exploitation,
then there is a strong prima facie case for prohibiting commercial surrogacy
and for refusing to enforce commercial surrogacy contracts. If commercial
surrogacy is a case of mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation, then
there is a strong prima facie case for allowing commercial surrogacy and for
enforcing commercial surrogacy contracts. I have examined several arguments
for the view that commercial surrogacy contracts should be prohibited or un-
enforceable because they are exploitative, even if commercial surrogacy is
mutually advantageous and consensual. I have suggested that several argu-
ments against that position are problematic at best.
I have decidedly not argued for the stronger position that commercial
surrogacy contracts should be allowed or enforced as a matter of public policy,
for that would require a determination as to whether commercial surrogacy is,
in fact, harmful and nonconsensual or mutually advantageous and consensual.
It would also require attention to reasons for prohibiting or refusing to enforce
commercial surrogacy contracts that are beyond the scope of this article. I
38. "[Surrogacy] contracts will turn women's labor into something that is used and con-
trolled by others and will reinforce gender stereotypes that have been used to justify the unequal
treatment of women." Satz, supra note 1, at 123-24.
39. See SHALEV, supra note 36.
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have argued that it does not follow that surrogacy contracts should be prohibit-
ed or unenforceable just because they are exploitative-if the transaction is
consensual and mutually advantageous.

